Apakah Transaksi dengan Pihak Berelasi yang Terindikasi Tunneling Mempengaruhi Firm Value?

Authors

  • Nadifa Amalia Gunadi Putri Universitas Padjajaran, Indonesia
  • Arie Pratama Universitas Padjajaran, Indonesia

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.33603/ejpe.v7i1.1879

Abstract

Transaksi dengan pihak berelasi merupakan transaksi umum dalam kegiatan bisnis sehari-hari dan telah menjadi bahan perdebatan mengenai apakah transaksi tersebut memberikan pengaruh positif maupun negatif terhadap perusahaan. Penelitian ini dilakukan untuk memahami bagaimana nilai perusahaan bereaksi terhadap pinjaman kepada pihak berelasi (atau piutang lain-lain kepada pihak berelasi). Variabel bebas dalam penelitian ini adalah pinjaman yang diberikan kepada pihak berelasi, variabel terikat yaitu nilai perusahaan, dan ukuran perusahaan sebagai variabel kontrol. Sampel ditentukan dengan kriteria sampel dan menghasilkan 417 observasi yang terdiri dari perusahaan terdaftar di seluruh sektor di Bursa Efek Indonesia dengan mengecualikan sektor keuangan. Data diuji dengan analisi regresi data panel untuk menguji hipotesis yang telah dikembangkan. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa perusahaan dengan nilai pinjaman yang diberikan kepada pihak berelasi lebih kecil memiliki nilai perusahaan yang lebih besar, karena transaksi tersebut merupakan salah satu cara memindahkan kekayaan dari perusahaan. Selain itu, ukuran perusahaan juga mempengaruhi nilai perusahaan dengan cara yang sama.

Keywords: firm value, transaksi dengan pihak berelasi, tunneling.

Author Biography

Arie Pratama, Universitas Padjajaran

Dosen Program Studi Magister Akuntansi, Universitas Padjajaran

References

Atasanov, V., Black, B., & Ciccotello, C. S. (2008). Unbundling and Measuring Tunneling. University of Illinois Law Review 2014 (5), 1697 - 1738.

Atasanov, V., Black, B., & Ciccotello, C. S. (2011). Law and Tunneling. Journal of Corporation Law Vol. 37 No. 1, 1-49.

Bae, S. J., Kang, J. K., & Park, K. S. (2004). Corporate Governance and Firm Value: Evidence from The Korean Financial Crisis. Journal of Financial Economics 71, 265 - 313.

Berkman, H., Cole, R. A., & Fu, L. J. (2009). Expropriation through Loan Guarantees to Related Parties: Evidence from China. Journal of Banking & Finance 33 , 141 - 156.

Chau, G., & Gray, S. J. (2010). Family Ownership, Board Independence, and Voluntary Disclosure: Evidence from Hong Kong. Journal of International Accounting Auditing and Taxation, Vol. 19, No. 2, 93-109.

Cheung, Y. L., Rau, P. R., & Stouraitis, A. (2006). Tunneling, Propping, and Expropriation: Evidence from Connected Party Transactions in Hong Kong. Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 82 (2), 343 - 386.

Christiawan, Y. J., & Tarigan, J. (2007). Kepemilikan Manajeral: Kebijakan Hutang, Kinerja, dan Nilai Perusahaan. Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan 9 (1), 1 - 8.

Claessens, S., Djankov, S., & Lang, L. H. (2000). The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations. Journal of Financial Economics 58, 81-112.

Doidge, C., Karolyi, G. A., & Stulz, R. M. (2004). Why Are Foreign Firms Listed in The U.S. Worth More? Journal of Financial Economics 71, 205 - 238.

Gordon, E. A., Henry, E., & Palia, D. (2004). Related Party Transactions and Corporate Governance. Advances in Financial Economics Vol. 9 , 1 - 27.

Hair, J., Black, W., Babin, B., & Anderson, R. (2009). Multivariate Data Analysis, 7th Edition. New York: Pearson Higher Education.

Harmono. (2009). Manajemen Keuangan berbasi Balanced Scorecard (Pendekatan Teori, Kasus, dan Riset Bisnis). Jakarta: Bumi Aksara.

Higgins, C. R. (2006). Analysis for Financial Management. Eight Edition. Singapore: McGraw Hill.

Huang, D.-T., & Liu, Z.-C. (2010). A Study of The Relationship between Related Party Transactions and Firm Value in High Technology Firms in Taiwan and China. African Journal of Business Management 4 (9), 1924 - 1931.

IAI. (2015). PSAK 7: Pengungkapan Pihak-pihak Berelasi. DSAK IAI.

Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3 (4), 305 - 360.

Jian, M., & Wong, T. J. (2010). Propping through Related Party Transactions . Review of Accounting Studies 15 (1), 70 - 105.

Jiang, G., Lee, C., & Yue, H. (2010). Tunneling thorugh Intercorporate Loans: The China Experience. Journal of Financial Economics 98 (1) , 1 - 20.

Johnson, S., Porta, R. L., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2000). Tunneling. American Economic Review, Vol. 90, 22-27.

Kohlbeck, M., & Mayhew, B. W. (2010). Valuation of Firms that Disclose Related Party Transactions. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Vol. 29 (2), 115 - 137.

La-Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (1999). Corporate Ownership Around The World. Journal of Finance, Vol. 54, 471-517.

Loon, L. K., & Ramos, A. D. (2009). Related- Party Transations: Cautionary Tales for Investors in Asia. Asia-Pacific Office of the CFA Institute Centre for Financial Market Integrity.

Munir, S., Saleh, N. M., Jaffar, R., & Yatim, P. (2013). Family Ownership, Related Party Transactions and Earning Quality . Asian Academy of Management Journal of Accounting and Finance 9 (1), 129 - 153.

Nekhili, M., & Cherif, M. (2011). Related Parties Transactions and Firm's Market Value: The French Case. Review of Accounting and Finance 10 (3), 291 - 315.

Pizzo, M. (2013). Related Party Transactions Under A Contingency Perspective. Journal of Management & Governance, 17(2), 309-330.

Siregar, S. V., & Sidharta, U. (2008). Type of Earnings Management and The Effect of Ownership Structure, Firm Size, and Corporate Governance Practice: Evidence from Indonesia. International Journal of Accounting 43 (1), 1 - 27.

Tambunan, M. E., Siregar, H., Manurung, A. H., & Priyarsono, D. S. (2017). Related Party Transactions and Firm Value in the Business Groups in the Indonesia Stock Exchange. Journal of Applied Finance & Banking 7 (3), 1 - 20.

Utama, S., Utama, C. A., & Yuniasih, R. (2010). Related Party Transactions - Efficient or Abusive: Indonesia Evidence. Asia Pacific Journal of Accounting and Finance Vol. 1 (1), 77 - 102.

Williamson, O. E. (1985). The Economic Institution of Capitalism. New York: The Free Pass.

Ying, Q., & Wang, L. (2013). Propping by Controlling Shareholders, Wealth Transfer and Firm Performance: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies. Journal of Accounting Research 6, 113 - 147.

Published

2019-04-02

Citation Check